John Speedy: A Modest Proposal for UK's ODA, March 2023
Updated: Oct 23
About this satirical essay
In A Modest Proposal, signed 30 March 2023, Professor John Speedy uses satire to challenge the incentives created by Official Development Assistance (ODA) accounting rules. Addressed to the UK’s development minister, the essay explores loans, export credit debt relief, equity investments, guarantees and the treatment of grants.
Original introduction from ODA Reform: John Speedy (who tells us he is Regius Chair of Developmental Mathematics and from Punkeydoodles Corners, Ontario, kindly gave us permission to post his article on this website. While we read this as a satirical piece, we harbour some fears that the UK Government may see this as a useful "how to" manual!
Editorial note: This is a satirical guest contribution, not literal policy advice. Its ironic praise, exaggerated proposals, author description, examples and references to proposed rule changes are retained in their original March 2023 context.
Laugh or despair, this is a unique contribution to the debate!
A Modest Proposal For preventing the Provision of Overseas Aid from being a Burthen to Taxpayers or the Country, and For making it Beneficial to the Publick Finances
By Professor John Speedy 2023
Below are my proposals, forwarded to Andrew Mitchell, Minister of State in the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. I suggested to the Minister that these proposals enable the UK to reap immediate financial benefits from modest reforms to its aid delivery mechanisms that take advantage of incentives created by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) at the OECD. These incentives have put an end to the need for overseas aid to involve any financial sacrifice from hard-working British taxpayers, and the UK government should take full advantage of this.
The cost of inaction and continuing to provide ODA in the form of grants under the current accounting system, would herald the UK’s rapid decline in the international “league table” of donors as they fail to keep pace with our European and other counterparts, some of whom are already ahead of us in delivering development assistance in ways that are profitable to their own treasuries.
Preface
Some years ago, a story was circulating about a government minister in my adopted country of Canada. The Minister, who had previously enjoyed a successful career in business, was an arrogant and pompous man who denigrated and bullied the civil servants around him, regardless of their performance or industry. As a result, he was deeply unpopular among the officials on whom he relied.
One day, due to a scheduling mix-up, this minister found himself in the unfortunate position of needing to deliver two speeches in the same evening in different cities. The first, which he spent a long time preparing himself, was to a group of the “party faithful” in Montreal. The second speech, back in Ottawa, would be a high-profile event in the presence of the Canadian media in which the Minister was to set out his economic vision. He left this speech to his officials to prepare.
Fully aware that the time constraints were such that the minister would have no opportunity to review the text of the second speech but would simply have to grab the paper as he mounted the stage, the officials diligently prepared his words.
His first speech had gone well: the party members had warmly applauded, and he had received accolades from many of his senior colleagues leaving little doubt (in the Minister’s mind at least) that he would be well-placed for a leadership bid in the coming months. Rushing to the next venue, and even though his flight had suffered no delay, the Minister arrived only moments before he was due to take to the stage for his second speech of the evening. He grabbed the papers from the waiting officials and strode onto the stage. The first page of the speech was remarkable: the Minister announced that he had a plan for strong economic growth and a huge rise in living standards without any build-up of inflationary pressures; he read that he was going to set out how the government would be able to invest massively in education, health and other public services to make these the envy of the world, without the need to raise any taxes. And he would set out how to return the economy to full employment while ensuring this did not lead to a wage-price spiral.
The Minister was feeling confident, bold and commanding, and the audience was gazing up at him expectantly and incredulously. Inwardly, he was even thinking that, for once, the civil service had delivered what he had been looking for (not that he would share the credit when this speech received the rapturous plaudits that would surely follow).
From the bottom of the first page, he read aloud: “And now I am going to explain how we can achieve this economic miracle!” He turned the page. It was blank except for seven words: “Now you are on your own, Minister!”
I am sure this story is apocryphal and invented by officials as a cautionary tale to politicians not to take their advisers for granted. But Minister, what if it were possible to find a major area of policy with only upsides, that would bring economic benefits to the UK, and increase the country’s standing across the world? Believe it or not, and starting on the very next page, I will explain exactly how you can achieve this seeming miracle…
Proposal
Minister, as you well know, there has been much debate recently around whether the UK can afford to return to its previous commitment to spend 0.7 per cent of its national income on overseas aid. But what if you could meet or even exceed this target and it not cost UK taxpayers anything at all? What if you could actually make a profit for UK taxpayers by meeting this longstanding commitment? And what if you could make an even bigger profit by exceeding the agreed target so that the more you give the more you make? Well, you can and you should!
Set out below are just some of the recent changes to the rules for counting ODA, from which your government and UK taxpayers can benefit. (Incidentally, it would be wrong not to acknowledge the credit owed to your administration as, from 2019 until just a few weeks ago, an official from the FCDO, Susanna Moorehead, chaired the Development Assistance Committee (the DAC) of the OECD, the body that has developed these extraordinary opportunities.)
The secret behind the DAC’s innovations is that it has recognised that aid scoring is not an accounting process but a political function. Wisely ignoring the OECD’s own Recommendation on Good Statistical Practice, which advised that impartiality, objectivity, transparency and rigour were important in the collection of statistics, the DAC has recognised that numbers are, at their heart, political. As Ms. Moorehead declared recently, assigning numbers to the efforts that donor countries are making in favour of development “is art not science; this is politics not statistics”.
The DAC clearly drew its inspiration from the renowned British physicist and philosopher, Douglas Adams. Many recall Adams’ revelation that the answer to the most fundamental challenge of all, to “life, the universe and everything” was “42[1]”, but we should not overlook that in his later work he revealed the exact question to which that was the answer: “what do you get if you multiply six by nine?”
Inspired by Adams and determined to translate his pathbreaking insights into mathematical formulae and statistical processes of general application, the DAC decided in 2016 to “modernise” their aid accounting method to score “donor effort” in a raft of financial instruments many of which they admitted in advance would be costless to the donor.
So let’s look in turn at each of the opportunities that the DAC is now offering as a result of its ongoing modernisation reforms, and how the UK could benefit.
I. Concessional Loans
The first task the DAC set itself under its modernisation agenda was reforming the ODA scoring of loans. They boldly proclaimed that their new method of measuring loans’ “grant equivalent”, which came into effect from 2018, would ensure that the donor effort in loans and grants could be realistically compared.
A naïve, simplistic approach would have seen the DAC calculate the net cost borne by donor governments in extending such loans, and count this as ODA. In this way, a government would know that its true costs of extending development assistance – whether through loans or grants – would be measured accurately. Decisions could then be made on the most appropriate instrument depending on factors such as the project’s generation of revenues to sustain repayments or the debt stress of the recipient government. But, inspired by Douglas Adams, the DAC realised that developing countries far prefer receiving big loans that they have to repay with interest to receiving their subsidies as grants. Accordingly, it wisely decided that loans should be incentivised over grants and that donors providing loans should score aid at many times the real cost they incur in providing those loans. They therefore put in place a system for calculating the ODA in loans using discount rates that far exceed the cost of funding for most DAC donors. They even added a clever way of counting the credit risk so that, should any of these loans not be repaid in full, and some or all of the repayments need to be forgiven or rescheduled, the costs of such debt relief could score as additional ODA, even though the risk had already been built into the ODA scored when the loans were extended. (As an aside, this has been grotesquely mischaracterised by some critics as “double counting”, which is simply not true. I shall shortly publish a separate paper, properly peer-reviewed, to explain why this scoring of ODA for debt relief on delinquent loans does not in any way justify removing the ODA already scored for the credit risks on loans that never default. My paper will explain how this is simply an entirely appropriate application of governmental “Hintervision”, which allows for simultaneous forward-looking and retrospective perspectives of risk, a concept that also underpins many of the sagacious reforms around PSIs – see below.)
The DAC’s success in incentivising loans has been spectacular: in an official Treasury document last year[2], the French Government shyly admitted that it has been scoring more than 5 euros of ODA for each 1 euro these loans have cost their taxpayers. In fact, the French are, characteristically, probably being too modest: independent assessments suggest that they may be scoring ODA closer to 10 times the budgetary cost of providing these loans. Moreover, many of these loans are at rates above French borrowing costs and are therefore yielding actual profits for the French Government while still scoring considerable ODA.
It is a sad reflection on the British lack of flair that, instead of availing yourselves of these opportunities, the UK has hitherto continued to provide the bulk of its overseas aid in the form of grants, where it only receives £1 of ODA credit for each £1 it spends. What sort of “leverage effect” (as the French call it) is that? If only the UK had been extending loans, your government could have been reaping the dual benefit of receiving net cashflow into the UK Treasury while still maintaining the country’s standing in the ODA league table, instead of watching financial flows go in the opposite direction – to developing countries – via grants.
Fortunately, it’s not too late to modernise the UK’s “giving” modalities. Although the profits that the UK can make from developing countries by extending ODA loans have reduced over recent months (as the government’s cost of borrowing has increased), it is still possible to score ODA on profitable loans given that the DAC’s ODA discount rates are SO high (7 percent for loans to the Indian Government for example). And of course, should any of the loans need to be rescheduled or forgiven, you would score yet more ODA.
This is therefore element one in this paper’s proposal for modernising the UK’s development assistance programme: institute a loan programme aimed at developing countries and use it to extend profitable loans that simultaneously score ODA.
II. Debt Relief on Export Credits
If ODA loans are an area where the UK has failed to realise the developmental and domestic financial benefits on offer, it can at least boast a prouder record when it comes to exploiting the ODA rules as they apply to government-supported export credits.
Export credits, including associated guarantees or insurance, are of course extended to promote trade and in particular to help a country’s domestically-based companies to sell their goods and services abroad. While these exports may in some cases contribute to overseas development, that is NOT their purpose. Accordingly, most projects supported by UK Export Finance (UKEF) and other export credit agencies (ECAs) around the world do not meet the DAC’s definition of ODA as having “the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective”. But, as explained below, that does not mean that they can never count as ODA.
You are probably aware that it is a requirement under international law that governments extending export credit support must levy risk premiums that cover both the risk of non-repayment of the loans extended/supported and the administrative costs of running the programmes. In most cases, these premium fees are passed on to the recipient country buyers in the prices they pay for the goods and services supported by the export credit loan or guarantee. Indeed, the UK has helped to put in place a rigorous system requiring that minimum risk premiums to cover the non-repayment risks are charged in all OECD countries, thereby ensuring both a level playing field and also that any losses from the operation of these programmes do not fall on donor country taxpayers.
Hence, when debt relief is required for these loans, there should be no budgetary effort whatsoever required on the part of the government that extended the export credit support. However, the DAC still allows donors to score ODA for relieving export credits, since they know how good it is for all its members to score ODA where there is neither donor effort nor development motivation, as this empowers them to reduce their real aid spending without seeming any less generous. And developing countries also reap the benefit of two valuable incentives: funding the cost of credit risk themselves spurs them to adopt better economic policies to minimise their risks of default, while receiving less real aid encourages their self-reliance.
So the second element of this paper’s proposal to the UK Government is to maintain or, even better, expand the provision by UKEF of official export credits: not only do they support UK exports of goods and services, but they can yield significant ODA at zero cost to the taxpayer when recipient countries cannot pay, resulting in claims.
But the UK can do even more in this area – see section below on “development guarantees”.
III. “Private Sector Instruments” (PSIs)
Although at a nascent stage of development, new DAC rules being developed for counting ODA for instruments typically used by the private sector in market-terms transactions offer potentially the biggest benefits of all to the UK: the opportunity to make huge profits from developing countries, while simultaneously scoring massive ODA.
This has been enabled by the enlightened DAC recognition back in 2016 that the main thing preventing donors from being seen to be extraordinarily generous in their development assistance was the outdated requirement that ODA had to be “concessional”. This antiquated provision required aid to involve some kind of wealth transfer from rich countries to poorer ones. It had been hanging around since the invention of the ODA concept in 1969, and for decades had ruled out the scoring of market-terms transactions and forced donors to spend real money to meet ODA targets. Wisely, the DAC decided to abolish it.
The DAC’s abolition of the need for ODA to involve “concessionality” must have followed high-level discussions with the United Nations, as it was the UN that had established the 0.7% ODA/GNI target with the idea that this would entail rich countries actually giving something away. Although the record of such "inter-inter-governmental” discussions between the UN and the OECD seems not to be available, I am sure that they took place. And the DAC displayed full openness and transparency by making a prominent and high-profile announcement of their epochal decision. No-one interested in international development could have missed the footnote they added to a parenthesis in the 5,800-word Annex they attached to their 2016 meeting communique, which proclaimed urbi et orbi:
“The Reporting Directives will be updated to take into account the fact that the “concessional in character” criterion is not appropriate for assessing the ODA characteristics of PSI.”
To take the place of concessionality, the DAC developed the concept that to count as ODA, donor investment/involvement in “private sector instruments” [that’s the PSI referred to in the footnote, which basically includes anything usually done at or near market terms] need only be shown to be “additional”, defined thus:
“In the context of reporting on PSI in DAC statistics, an official transaction is considered additional either because of its “financial additionality” or “value additionality”, combined with its “development additionality”. Such a transaction is financially additional if it is extended to an entity which cannot obtain finance from the private capital markets (local or international) with similar terms or quantities and for similar developmental purposes without official support, or if it mobilises investment from the private sector that would not have otherwise invested. It is additional in value if the official sector offers to recipient entities or mobilises, alongside its investment, non-financial value that the private sector is not offering and which will lead to better development outcomes, e.g. by providing or catalysing knowledge and expertise, promoting social or environmental standards or fostering good corporate governance. It conveys development additionality if the development impact of the investment would not have occurred without the partnership between the official and the private sector.”
As anyone can see, this is an extraordinarily clear and watertight definition, requiring substantial donor effort so as to avoid spoiling markets with piecemeal subsidies. After all, meeting its “financial additionality” test would require a donor to go to the extreme lengths of offering terms more generous than the borrower can get anyway from a private investor. Or, if that is really too much, it can score ODA for an action that somehow nudges a private investor over the line. Alternatively, it can offer a non-financial sweetener and claim ODA for being “developmentally additional”. Such rigorous and demanding disciplines should reassure anyone who fears that ODA could encroach on commercial transactions or lead to subsidy competition.
Other DAC countries have not been slow in finding ways to exploit this new and enlightened definition whereby donors can now score ODA for investing in financial instruments that are designed to (and do) make profits from developing countries, whether through investments, loans to the private sector or “development guarantees”. But I am sure that your FCDO officials working together with the best talent in the Treasury, can do even better.
i) Equity Investments
Donors are already able to make profits from their equity investment portfolios in developing countries without adversely affecting their ODA figures, since for the last few years the DAC has allowed them to score ODA for any investments that lose money while simply ignoring their profits on other investments, reporting instead that those investments “broke even”. Hence, a donor could, for example, make 10 investments, 9 of which are highly profitable, resulting in a net real transfer across the whole portfolio of huge resources from the poor country to the donor government, yet ignore all of those profits…and just score the loss on the 10th investment (which might be tiny compared to the profits on the others). Overall, the donor looks to have given something away, yet its investment programme has not only been cost-free to its taxpayers but has actually netted a large profit. A clear win-win for the donor and the countries receiving the investment.
Nevertheless, the DAC has long realised that this system is still insufficiently generous to donors. Already in 2016 it recognised the need to also incentivise individual profitable investments by scoring them as ODA. It planned to agree on precise methodology by 2018, but there has been a little slippage. Nevertheless the DAC’s recent paper DCD/DAC/STAT(2023)3 revives the plan.
The Secretariat helpfully provides this worked example at the end of the paper:
- A donor invests $20 million for five years.
- Each year the investment scores a dividend of between 5.5% and 9% (a pretty decent return, you must admit, Minister!)
- At the end of the five years, the donor sells the equity for a $22 million, a 10% capital gain on top of the annual dividend payments.
- Result: total nominal investment $20 million, total nominal reflow $29.1 million, i.e. a 45.5% total nominal profit over a five-year period, or an average annual return of 7.79%, compound.
- With the new proposed method this scores "grant equivalent" ODA of $2.54 million, or 12.7% of the amount invested!
The secret? A discount rate of 12%, including a total risk margin of 7%, applied to events in the past on which any risk has already been realised. This discount rate is so generous that, even if the investment had been sold for $26 million, i.e. a 30% capital gain on top of more than 35% in total dividend earnings, it would still have scored some ODA.
Of course, the DAC wisely maintained the rule that, no matter how high the profits may be, negative ODA is never recorded. Hence, using the same example, if the donor had sold for a whopping $120 million, ODA would hide the entirety of the 500% profit, recording a receipt of only $20 million, i.e. showing that the donor had only managed to “break even” by getting the original investment back.
Such an opportunity for donors to “make good while doing good” and “assist and extract” is exceptionally well-designed. The application of an ex post facto risk margin after the returns have already been received is a work of accounting genius by the DAC Secretariat and members, overturning centuries of outmoded thinking that financial risk margins can only quantify uncertainty about future payments. And of course, it’s another brilliant example of double-counting the credit risk, since a failed investment, where risk is actually realised and the invested money is lost, will count in full as ODA anyway. To sum up:
• Failed investment: 100% ODA.
• Successful, profitable investment: still counts ODA due to the “risk” being run.
• Wildly successful investment yielding huge profits: no permanent effect on ODA (reported as “broke even”).
So, the third part of this modest proposal to the UK Government, is that it should seek to make profitable equity investments in developing countries that will still score ODA.
ii) Development Guarantees
In addition to allowing ODA scoring for debt relief on the loans guaranteed by UKEF (despite there being no cost to the UK taxpayer) as outlined above, the DAC is opening up a new avenue allowing donors to score ODA upfront from the provision of “development loan guarantees”, even on loans that will be repaid in full with interest, so that the official sector’s only task will be to receive the premium fees or spread it charges for the guarantee.
This scoring of a transaction on which a donor only makes money is a logical development from the DAC’s abolition of ODA’s concessionality requirement in its widely-heralded and now world-famous footnote to a parenthesis in an annex to a communique. In fact, the basic plan for scoring guarantees as ODA was set out in the very same Annex back in 2016. Again there have been some implementation delays but the detailed draft methodology of how development guarantees will yield ODA is now found in DCD/DAC/STAT(2022)50/REV1. This will allow significant levels of ODA to be scored by donors, on an upfront basis, even when the risk of non-repayment is fully covered by fees or interest rate margins paid by the borrower of the loan (typically passed on to the developing country buyer). We know the risk is being fully covered because in another area of its work, the OECD has developed and agreed minimum risk premiums that are set at a level to ensure that they are adequate to cover the operating costs and losses of export credit guarantee programmes, as required under international law. And these are FAR lower than the discount rates that the DAC is applying to calculate the “grant equivalent” of similar instruments when they are termed “development guarantees”. By way of example, UKEF would charge a risk premium equivalent to an interest rate margin of around 0.5% for guaranteeing a loan to the Chinese Government; a margin of around 0.8% for guaranteeing a loan to the Indian Government; and around 2.2% for such a loan to Rwanda. However, the DAC will calculate the ODA of guarantees for these loans using discount rates of 2%, 3% and 5% respectively, which has the effect of allowing donors to score ODA well above the costs of running the programmes and paying any claims that are likely to occur.
This represents yet another win-win-scenario: a donor guarantor can levy fees that fully cover the risk of the guarantee being called plus all the administrative costs and still score lots of ODA, while the developing country borrower can take pride in the fact that it is likely paying the full market price to cover the risk that it may collapse under its debt burdens and default. Moreover, allowing donors to meet ODA targets with guarantees that cost them nothing again lets them reduce their real aid, giving poor countries a real incentive to achieve financial self-sufficiency.
Accordingly, the fourth element of this modest proposal is that the UK Government should strip out any guarantees that UKEF is extending for projects that could be claimed – even at a stretch – as being “administered with the promotion of economic development and welfare of developing countries as their main objective”. These can then start scoring ODA as they can be distinguished from other “trade and export credit guarantees” which, regrettably, may still have to be excluded from ODA, at least for the time being, according to the eligibility criteria in Paragraph 3 of the Secretariat paper.
This will allow the UK government to levy fees to fully cover the risk of its sustaining losses on its “development” guarantees, yet still score ODA upfront. And in addition, it will be able to claim even more ODA if any of the guarantees are called and debt relief is needed.
iii) Other PSIs
Freed from the shackles of having to demonstrate “concessionality” in ODA, the DAC is looking to calculate generous “grant equivalents” and hence introduce strong incentives for donors’ use of other profitable PSIs to improve their ODA scores. These include loans to private sector entities and mezzanine finance. Again, these offer significant opportunities for the UK to redirect its development effort into areas that will enable it to easily meet its current
ODA commitments and in fact return to the 0.7% of GNI commitment at a profit rather than a cost to its taxpayers. In fact, in theory, the more the UK exceeds the 0.7% target using these instruments, the more profit it can make.
Responding to the Counter-Arguments
In writing this piece, I am conscious that some people – mostly starry-eyed idealists with antiquated views on development – will need convincing of the arguments made here. There has been growing, albeit misguided, questioning of the DAC’s enlightened moves to modernise ODA by negating the outdated idea that it should entail some cost, financial effort, or wealth transfer from donors to recipient countries.
Below are two of the frequently asked questions, with my convincing counter-narratives.
i) Shouldn’t the concept of “donor effort” mean cost to the taxpayer – so that ODA is a measure of each donor country’s generosity in meeting its commitment to spend 0.7% of its GNI for Official development Assistance?
How naïve! The concept of “donor effort” being calculated in terms of terms of financial effort from the donor is an anachronism that ignores the huge mutual benefits of rewarding donors for investing in profitable instruments.
“Donor effort” could mean all sorts of things and it doesn’t need to be defined beyond saying that it is whatever the donors in the DAC decide to include in ODA. Today ODA rightly encompasses several intangible and imaginative elements, and this is why it should no longer be seen as a “measure” of any one thing counted consistently according to accepted statistical principles.
Indeed, in future and in alignment with the philosophy of counting the intangible and incentivising certain behaviours, the UK Government may wish to suggest to the DAC that ODA scoring should be further extended to cover all the time and “effort” spent by government officials in aid agencies wishing really hard for the elimination of hunger, poverty, gender inequality, denial of human rights, climate change and conflict. Admittedly the financial costs of administration are already allowed, but what about the psychological cost of worrying about world poverty, or of the guilt feelings afflicting those who cling to the notion that ODA has to involve real spending? And what about the night-time agonising of those officials who really care about tackling the development challenges and want to provide real assistance in this regard, and don’t think just about their careers? They should at least be compensated for this “overtime” through the scoring of ODA. An alternative would be to offer redundancy packages to anyone who joined the aid units of the FDCO wanting to provide real development assistance. Such packages can themselves be booked as extra ODA.
ii) Aren’t grants being financially disincentivised, even though they are needed in many areas of development?
As mentioned above, the DAC’s current “grant equivalent” methodology gives donors far more credit for loans than for grants of equivalent cost. No doubt recipients appreciate that loans stretch aid further because donors can recycle all the interest they receive into other projects and countries that, given the DAC’s reforms, can provide them with yet more financial returns, and yet more ODA credit. Loans are also good for discipline in recipient governments as they incentivise officials to carefully scrutinize proposed projects’ benefits to see whether they justify taking on the burden of the repayments. And, of course, meeting the burden of repaying loans with interest means that recipient countries can look forward to receiving more and more ODA loans that they can enjoy repaying in the future.
On the other hand, we have to recognise that the DAC’s scoring of grants has not kept pace with its highly innovative approach to the calculation of “grant-equivalents”. Such a discrepancy is perfectly defensible in a system of counting that eschews boring mathematical logic in favour of providing dynamic political incentives. However, it is undeniable that grants are still desired by some aid recipients, and it’s clear that grants are not being treated entirely fairly under the DAC’s reforms so far. After all, the UK is only scoring one pound of ODA for each pound your government gives in grants, while your sophisticated French counterparts have been shyly acknowledging that they score more than five euros of ODA for each euro their loans actually cost them.
There is an obvious solution to this problem: the scoring of grants needs to be changed so that they are equivalent with their “grant equivalents”. The UK should propose in the DAC to recalculate the ODA counted for grants according to its “Grant Equivalent Equivalence” or GEE. This would help to meet calls from the aid community to restore proportionality between the financial effort of donors and the amount of ODA they score.
But what does this mean in practice? Based on the assessment by some analysts that concessional loans are scoring at least 7 euros for each euro of budgetary effort by France and Germany for example, the “GEE” of a £1 million grant could reasonably score £7 million of ODA. This would both be fair and completely transparent and understandable to taxpayers across donor countries.
But perhaps as a first stage, Minister, the pitch should be for the DAC to allow the UK to count a more modest £5 of ODA for each £1 it actually spends in grants, to bring it into line with declared Continental “ODA leverage”. Just think what a quintupling of ODA from the UK’s existing grants programme would mean in terms of its seeming generosity, to say nothing of your ability to cut real aid spending and devote the savings to other priorities!
Conclusion
As set out in this paper, the UK Government should realign its development efforts to take maximum advantage of the ongoing enlightened ODA modernisation reforms negotiated in the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD.
The UK Government has suffered significant adverse criticism recently for seeking to minimise its expenditure of official development assistance by reducing its target to 0.5% of GNI. Press stories have also lambasted the government for cutting real aid due to ODA scoring of the costs of supporting refugees in the UK. And your government has been further berated for scoring ODA for donating surplus COVID-19 vaccines bought in huge quantities when they first became available, but which were unneeded and remained unused until they were nearing the end of their shelf life, leaving the political choice of throwing them away or giving them away.
Minister, you must realise that journalists and the general public can easily understand issues like this and often feel uncomfortable as they can clearly see that the UK government is not being as generous as they would wish.
On the other hand, in the current state of the UK’s finances, it would be crazy to tackle these PR problems head-on by spending more money when you can MAKE money instead, while appearing to be extraordinarily bountiful. The measures advocated in this paper involve taking advantage of the DAC’s wonderfully high discount rates, creative and expansive counting of credit risk, and asymmetric treatment of equity investments. Doing so would enable the UK to easily exceed its original 0.7% target. Yet any adverse criticism would be muted and blunted as the techniques offered by the DAC are far too esoteric and complex to bring public or press criticism. And the whole process could be done under cover of just abiding by DAC ODA rules, as if you had nothing to do with them. You could deflect any criticism by pointing out that the UK is only following OECD/DAC directives (including those your government may quietly suggest to the DAC yourselves). After all, this defence has proved effective to date, as the media think of the OECD as a paragon of statistical rectitude and of the DAC as a disinterested donor group driven solely by a collective determination to bring benefits to poorer countries.
Minister, it has been reported that you have opposed calls to open the definition of ODA[3], as this would be akin to opening a Pandora’s Box. However, as you can see, the “box” has been open for some time and the unboxing has even been under the UK’s stewardship over the past four years. Happily, your fears have proven unfounded and what has emerged has not been misery and evil as in the original Pandora myth, but droves of winged creatures resembling Crysaor, son of Poseidon and brother of Pegasus, wielding golden swords to cut away the chaff of outdated notions of aid, such as “giving”. Indeed, you would probably have to go back nearly 20 years, to the repackaging of Mortgage-Backed Securities into Collateralised Debt Obligations, to see financial alchemy being deployed to such positive effect as in the reforms around ODA. And, as a result, “new ODA” is nothing less than an immaculate conception, a veritable miracle of financial innovation.
So in summary, and adding one last recommendation, here is my modest proposal:
To maximise the benefits of its development assistance and take advantage of the modernisation measures being pursued in the DAC, the UK Government should:
1. Institute a loan programme aimed at developing countries where the UK can extend profitable loans that score ODA.
2. Maintain (or even better expand) the provision by UKEF of official export credits: not only do they support UK exports of goods and services, but they can yield significant ODA at zero cost to the taxpayer whenever recipient countries cannot pay and claims are made. The UK can also work on packaging the credits themselves (perhaps as “tied aid”?) in such a way that they can score ODA upfront even though they are unsubsidised.
3. Make equity investments in developing countries that can both be profitable and score ODA.
4. Identify any guarantees that UKEF is extending for projects that could be claimed – even at a stretch – as being “administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as their main objective”. These can then score as ODA while simultaneously being operated on a full cost recovery basis.
5. Exploit other opportunities to extend PSIs that bring positive financial returns to the UK, including through loans to private sector entities in developing countries and mezzanine finance, where the DAC is planning to provide further powerful incentives through additional changes to ODA rules.
6. Negotiate that ODA for grants is counted on a Grant Equivalent Equivalence (GEE) basis, thereby massively boosting the ODA credit that the UK receives for the grants that it gives.
7. In order to pave the way for the GEE proposal, continue to deploy all the UK’s considerable statecraft, soft power and international leadership to secure a consensus at the meeting of the DAC in April 2023 to approve all the modernisation measures currently being proposed, which offer win-wins for donors and recipient countries alike.
I am taking the liberty of copying the development spokespersons of both the Labour and Liberal Democrat Parties in the hope that there may be a cross-party consensus forged around the progressive proposals made in this letter.
Certainly, I would hope that no UK political party would entertain some of the wilder ideas being propagated by certain discredited commentators, such as only scoring ODA for donors’ real costs in extending loans, or stopping the double-counting of loan risk, or ruling out ODA scoring on instruments that entail absolutely no financial effort. For it is these practices that bring all the benefits I have set out in this letter.
And finally, I hope that none of the recipients of this letter pays any heed to the crazy suggestions being advanced by numerous disinformation spreaders and conspiracy theorists that responsibility for ODA accounting should be removed from the DAC simply because it is a self-interested body comprising only donor governments meeting behind closed doors to decide how to flatter its own members’ performances. You should firmly reject any notion of having ODA rules set by an independent body comprising statisticians who are free from political influence. That would only have downsides: creativity in accounting would be stifled, statistics would be calculated according to strict methodologies, and the UK would be condemned to return to a position where its aid programmes actually cost money.
After all, although parties may differ about HOW to spend the proceeds (whether on tax cuts or increases in public spending for example), no serious politician could oppose the government taking action that would simultaneously promote the UK’s position in the international league table of “donor generosity” and see massive revenue streams flow into public coffers from poorer developing countries. After all, isn’t that what Development Assistance is supposed to be about?
Yours Faithfully,
Professor John Speedy 30 March 2023
Source notes and references
[1] References from Adams’ “Trilogy in Five Parts”: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Hitchhiker%27s_Guide_to_the_Galaxy
[2] See page 11 https://www.budget.gouv.fr/documentation/file-download/13582
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