Simon Scott: Caps Are For Dunces!
Updated: 5 days ago

Simon Scott examines various "caps" on ODA reporting that impose articial limits on the amounts recorded for equity-sale proceeds and debt relief actions, and govern the option available to donors to switch between different methods of reporting on "private sector instruments". He shows how such such caps obscure investment returns and distort the measurement of donor effort.
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Caps are for dunces
by Simon Scott
How would you feel if your government decided to cap the statistical reporting of something that would have made them look bad – pollution levels, illiteracy, housebreaking, whatever – at some fixed level? It would still pay the statisticians out of your taxes, but you would only see the capped figure as the “official statistic”, not the real number.
I imagine you wouldn’t be pleased. You’d think you were being lied to, while paying for the privilege. At any rate, that’s what you’d think if you found out. More likely, you wouldn’t know, and you’d just be conned into thinking that reality was rosier than it really was.
The DAC has been hoping to con you in just this way for several years now by capping its reporting of official development assistance (ODA) on equity sales. Now, most official equity investments are screened for commercial viability at the outset – governments don’t actually want to lose money – and so should not be reported as ODA in the first place. But since the DAC has abolished ODA’s concessionality requirement, all “developmental” equity investment can now score ODA upfront.
Of course, come the year the asset is sold, there is a negative amount to report as a receipt. For decades the rule was always that donors had to report the full amount of sale proceeds as negative ODA. A profitable sale therefore meant that ODA overall would be negative, in nominal terms. But this made donors look bad – as if they had made a profit (which they had) instead of giving aid for development (which they hadn’t).
The solution was to introduce an artificial cap to make donors look artificially good. We can see the precise moment at which this fiddle was worked. On 4 December 2018, the second revision of a DAC document crossed out the requirement to report negative ODA overall if a profit had been made and instead imposed a “cap on reflows”. The first sentence on page 4 of that document is still in track-changes mode and it looks like this:

[Original tracked-change illustration of the cap on reflows in the December 2018 reporting document.]
Hey presto, no more overall negative ODA! At the stroke of a pen, reported equity sale proceeds are now capped at the originally invested amount. Even if the sale is at ten times the original purchase price, so that the donor makes a 900% profit, the ODA receipt recorded will only be that original price – not even adjusted for inflation.
You may think this is ridiculously generous. But the DAC does not think it is generous enough. They now have a new wheeze to propose. When they sell the investment, they will first discount all the reflows on it by up to 13% a year (this is the rate for low-income countries), and only report this discounted amount as their ODA receipt. This means that any investment in a poor country that earns less than 13% a year will score positive ODA overall.
Of course, if total returns are 1000%, even discounting them at 13% p.a. probably won’t get them down below the original purchase price. But not to worry, the cap will still apply, so that reported receipts will never exceed the original, nominal amount of the investment.
Private investors could only dream about getting a deal like this. If they could sell their investments for a 900% profit and tell the taxman they only got their money back, they could make short work of capital gains tax in every country on earth!
Unfortunately for them they can’t do anything of the kind, and they’d face fraud charges if they tried. But DAC members write their own receipts, and they are getting a real taste for caps. They also imposed one on the ODA reporting of relief on an ODA loan. There it serves to hide the embarrassing fact that, without it, their new methodology could score more for a loan on which the repayment terms had merely been softened than if the whole amount had been given as a grant.
The DAC are now also proposing another sort of cap by only allowing donors to switch reporting methods on “private sector instruments” from the “institutional” to the “instrument” basis after the ODA they would have scored with the latter equals the ODA they have scored with the former. (The institutional approach records net contributions to a development finance institution (DFI) or similar vehicle, while the instrument approach records ODA for the institution’s loans, investments and other transactions.)
This proposed new cap is ostensibly to prevent double-counting. The trouble is, donors’ contributions to institutions come before those institutions start operations. And a second problem is that the instrument method uses excessive discount rates to score bogus ODA “grant equivalents” on profitable transactions.
In combination, these two problems mean the new cap just provides another way for donors to inflate their ODA. First, they front-load it with the institutional approach by reporting their initial capital injections into a new development finance vehicle. Then they wait until the vehicle has generated enough fake ODA grant equivalents from its investments to switch to the instrument approach, whereupon they can score cost-free ODA in perpetuity as the vehicle endlessly recycles its earnings into new transactions.
One wonders what developing countries will make of the resulting figures. First, they are going to see a donor report ODA for contributing to its own DFI – before they have received anything; and later they’ll see the donor scoring ever more ODA on transactions where the overall net flow is in the wrong direction – from their countries back into the donor’s coffers.
The DAC’s aim with all their caps is to make themselves look better than they are. But from a statistical point of view, they are beclowning themselves. And it’s not even funny, because it’s your money they are using to do it, and in the end, caps are just lies.



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